AIRPROX REPORT No 2023184

Date: 09 Aug 2023 Time: ~1231Z Position: 5355N 00050W Location: 1.5NM SW Pocklington

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	P68	Unknown Glider
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Gld
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Unknown
Provider	London Info'n	N/A
Altitude/FL	1700ft	NK
Transponder	A, C, S+	NK
Reported		
Colours	White/blue	White
Lighting	Nav, strobe, beacon	NR
Conditions	VMC	NR
Visibility	5-10km	NR
Altitude/FL	1800ft	NR
Altimeter	QNH (NK hPa)	NK (NK hPa)
Heading	NK	NR
Speed	100kt	NR
ACAS/TAS	TAS	NR
Alert	None	NR
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/100m H	NR
Recorded	NK	



THE P68 PILOT reports conducting a survey flight over power-lines which took them in the proximity of Pocklington glider site. They had visual contact with a glider, when all of a sudden another glider pulled up from below, seen through the right side cockpit window. Neither of the gliders were equipped with transponders and thus not seen on the [TAS]. They turned to the left and departed the survey area immediately.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE GLIDER PILOT could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at Humberside was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNJ 091250Z 27010KT 240V310 9999 SCT035 22/13 Q1017=
METAR EGNJ 091220Z 27010KT 9999 SCT035 22/12 Q1017=
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The P68 and glider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is

[1] UK Reg (EU) SERA.3205 Proximity.

considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the P68 pilot was required to give way to the glider.[3] If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the glider pilot had right of way and the P68 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.[4]

The glider did not appear on radar and its pilot could not be traced.

Comments

BGA

UK glider launch sites are listed in UK AIP ENR 5.5 and labelled on the CAA VFR charts with a "G" symbol, as shown in the chart segment in Part A. A greater density of gliders may be expected nearby at any time during daylight hours, and at any altitude up to cloudbase.

Gliders operating within 10NM of Pocklington airfield below 3000ft AAL usually monitor VHF channel 118.685 (as notified on CAA charts and in AIP ENR 5.5). If transiting nearby, a brief broadcast call using "Unattended Aerodrome" phraseology (CAP 413 §4.179 et seq) would increase everyone's situational awareness and help avoid conflicts.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a P68 and an unknown glider flew into proximity near Pocklington at about 1231Z on Wednesday 9th August 2023. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the P68 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information and the glider pilot likely not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the P68 pilot and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board agreed that there was insufficient information with which to make a determination of the risk of collision so the Airprox was classified as Risk D. The following contributory factors were felt to have been relevant:

CF1: The P68 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service and the London Information FISO was not required to monitor the flight.

CF2: The P68 pilot had no situational awareness of the proximity of the closing glider.

CF3: The glider was likely not equipped with EC compatible with that fitted to the P68.

CF4: The P68 pilot saw the glider at a late stage.

[2] UK Reg (EU) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.
[3] UK Reg (EU) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.
[4] UK Reg (EU) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2023184			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: D.

Safety Barrier Assessment[5]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the P68 pilot was in receipt of only a Basic Service.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the P68 pilot was not aware of the proximity of the glider before sighting it.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the P68 TAS was not activated.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the P68 pilot saw the glider but at a late stage.

[5] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2023184
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness